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DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONS* 
RAAJ K. SAH AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 
A central task of the leadership of any organization is the 
choice of its successors and subordinates. Corporate presidents 
spend a significant part of their time selecting upper management. 
Tenured faculty sometimes spends months deciding whether par- 
ticular individuals should be admitted into their ranks. The effort 
and contentiousness which often go into this process suggests that 
it has important consequences for the organization. It is recognized 
that there are large differences in individuals' abilities and that the 
abilities of those in leadership inevitably affect the performance 
and survival of the organization. 
Our objective here is to examine how the centralization or 
decentralization of decision-making authority affects the quality of 
the managers who are actually selected. This question is naturally 
dynamic because the quality of current managers is not only 
influenced by that of past managers, but it, in turn, affects the 
quality of future managers. 
We consider stylized economies consisting of an arbitrary 
number of hierarchies (organizations) of different sizes. The size of 
a hierarchy is the number of managers within the hierarchy, one of 
whom is the hierarch (the boss) and others are subordinates. The 
current hierarch appoints his own successor and those of his 
subordinates, but has no influence on any other hierarchy. (This 
assumption exaggerates somewhat the typical asymmetry of author- 
ity between the hierarch and the subordinates.) Our definition of a 
"more" or "less" centralized economy is intuitive: an economy is 
more centralized if it has a larger proportion of the total number of 
managers in larger hierarchies. 
Our main result is that there is a greater variability (over time) 
in the steady-state quality of managers in a more centralized 
economy. This is because highly capable decision-makers have 
greater beneficial effects on the managerial choices in a more 
centralized economy. By the same token, highly incapable manag- 
ers placed in the same positions have greater deleterious effects. 
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The overall effect of a greater centralization, therefore, is to induce 
a greater variability in the economy's managerial quality. 
A natural next question is what is the relationship between the 
degree of centralization and the economy's output. The answer 
depends on, among other things, the nature of the relationship 
between managers' abilities and organizational output. We have 
investigated in detail a simple case in which managers choose 
projects in addition to their successors and subordinates. 
I. MANAGERIAL QUALITY 
There are two types of managers: those with high and those 
with low abilities to select managers; they are referred to as "good" 
and "bad" managers, respectively. If a high-ability manager selects 
a future manager, he (she) will select a high-ability manager with 
probability q1, and a low-ability manager with probability 1 - q1. 
The corresponding probabilities for a low-ability manager are q2 
and 1 - q2. We assume that 1 > q1 > q2 > 0; that is, while neither 
type of manager is perfect, each type has some ability to select 
high-ability managers.1 
Let nM(s) denote the number of hierarchies of size M in 
economy s, where M ? 1. Let N(s) = 1MMnM(s) denote the total 
number of managers in economy s. Then, according to our 
definition, economy s' is more centralized than s, if N(s) = N(s') = 
N, and if 
(1) EMnm(s) 2 E Mnm(s ), 
M < J M < J 
for all J > 1, and the strict inequality holds in (1) for at least one J. 
That is, if the proportions of the total number of managers in an 
economy who are in hierarchies of different sizes are viewed as a 
discrete probability density function, then the economy s' is more 
centralized than s if this density function in s' is a first-order 
stochastic improvement over that in s. For later use, define the 
average size of a hierarchy in economy s as 
(2) h (s) = E M2 nm (S) 
1. We treat q's as exogenous parameters. In another context (namely, the effect 
of homogeneous individuals' fallibility concerning project choice on organizational 
performance), analogous probabilities are endogenized in Sah and Stiglitz [1986a]. 
The role of fallibility under alternative organizational forms such as committees, 
hierarchies, and polyarchies is analyzed in Sah and Stiglitz [1988]. See Sah [1991] 
for an overview. 
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It is obvious then that the average size of a hierarchy is larger in a 
more centralized economy. That is, 
(3) h(s) < h(s'). 
Now consider a hierarchy of size M in isolation from all other 
constituents of the economy. The random variable m denotes the 
number of good managers. Within the present hierarchy, m 
assumes values from 0 to M. Let g(m IM) denote the steady-state 
density of m in this hierarchy. Then, 
2 
(4) g(mIM) Ezkb(m,M,qk), 
k=1 
where 
(5) z1 = q2/(1 - Q), Z2= 1 - z1 = (1 - qj)/(1 - Q), 
Q - - q2, and b(mM,qk) (m)qr (1 - qk)M-m is the binomial 
density of m successes out of M trials when qk is the probability of 
each success. 
The derivation of (4) is highly intuitive. The succession process 
depends critically on the hierarch because the subordinates do not 
influence it. z1 is the (steady-state) probability that the hierarch is a 
good manager, and Z2 is the probability that the hierarch is a bad 
manager.2 Further, the binomial density b(m,M,ql) is the probabil- 
ity that m good managers are chosen when the hierarch is good, 
and b(mM,q2) is the corresponding probability when the hierarch 
is bad. Straightforward combination of these probabilities yields 
(4). 
Next, let X(M) and v(M), respectively, denote the mean and the 
variance of the number of good managers in a hierarchy of size M. 
Then, (4), (5), and the standard properties of the binomial variate 
yield 
2 
(6) X(M) = Mz1, and v(M) = M2z1z2Q2 + M Y Zkqk(1 - qk) 
k=l 
To analyze the economy s as a whole, let A(s) and V(s), 
respectively, denote the mean and the variance of the number of 
2. In the steady state, z1 = zjqj + z2q2, because q1 is the probability of selecting a 
good manager as the next period's hierarch if the current hierarch is good, whereas 
q2 is the corresponding probability if the current hierarch is bad. Using Z2 = 1 - Z1, 
the preceding expression yields (5). 
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good managers in this economy. Since the mean or the variance of a 
sum of independent random variables is the sum of their respective 
means or variances, (2) and (6) yield 
(7) A(s) = Nz1, and V(s) = [ziz2Q2h(s) + Zkqk (1 - qak)] N. 
It follows that the number of good managers in a more centralized 
economy has the same mean but a higher variance. 
Expressions (2) and (7) yield an additional result. Even when 
two economies are not comparable, in the sense that one of them is 
more centralized based on our definition, it is still the case that an 
economy with a larger average size of a hierarchy has a larger 
variance in the number of good managers. 
Next, consider the distribution of good managers. If Tr(m Is) 
denotes the probability density associated with the state in which 
there are m good managers in economy s, then ir(m Is) for various 
m 's are obtained from the convolution of the densities given by (4). 
For instance, 
2 nm(s) 




(9) Tr(Nj s) = iIM{z Zkb(M,M,qk) 
k=1 
denote the probabilities associated with the polar states where, 
respectively, none of the managers is good, and none of the 
managers is bad. It is easy to verify that Tr(O Ijs)/&qk < 0, and 
&vr(NI s)/&qk> 0, for k = 1 and 2. That is, if individual managers are 
more capable in choosing future managers, then the probability 
that an economy has all high-ability managers is higher, and the 
probability that the economy has all low-ability managers is lower. 
This is what one would expect. 
A general comparison of 'r(m I s) and 7r(m I s') is difficult, given 
the complexity of expressions such as (8) and (9). To obtain 
additional insights, therefore, we compare two economies with two 
managers each. The decentralized economy s has two hierarchies, 
each of size one (that is, n1(s) = 2, and nM(s) = 0 for M ? 1). The 
centralized economy s' has one hierarchy of two managers (that is, 
n2(s') = 1, and nM(s') = 0 for M ? 2). Values of the ir's can then be 
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explicitly calculated, using expressions such as (8) and (9), as 
(1 - q1)2 1 - q (10) rr(O Is) = a , r(1 s) = 2q2 a 
2 
and Tr(2jIs) = 
(1 1) Tr(?Is') =(1 - qj) 1 q2(1 + Q) 
1+Q q2 +qQ 
rr(lIs') 2q2(1- q) b and 7r(2 s')=q2 b 
where a (1 - Q)2, and b 1 - Q. From (10) and (11), 
(12) E 1E '(ils') - Tr(iIs)} 2 0, 
j<m i:j 
for all m, and the strict inequality holds for at least one m. 
Equivalently, Tr(m Is') is a mean-preserving spread of r(m Is). Thus, 
a greater centralization induces a mean-preserving spread in the 
number of good managers.3 
Finally, consider an alternative approach that illustrates, in 
the simple case in which there are two managers in ecomony s as 
well as in s', our earlier general result that the number of good 
managers has a higher variance in a more centralized economy.4 
Denote the steady-state quality of the ith manager by the random 
variable X, where i = 1 and 2, and Xi is 1 or 0 depending on 
whether the manager is good or bad. Then, PrjXj = 1} = zj, and 
PrjXj = 0} = Z2, as described in (5). It is clear that these probabilities 
do not depend on the economy to which the manager belongs. 
Thus, the economy does not affect the moments of Xi (including its 
variance); it only affects the correlation among these variables. 
Note that V(s) var(X, + X21s) = var(X1) + var(X2) + 2cov(XlX2 s). 
Now, it is apparent and can be easily established that cov(X1,X2 Is) = 
0, because the two managers are chosen by two different hierarchs 
in economy s, and that cov(X1,X2 s') > 0, because the two 
managers are chosen by the same hierarch in economy s'. Thus, 
V(s') > V(s). 
3. This result, (12), is likely to hold regardless of the size N of the system. 
Partial support for this conjecture comes from (8) and (9) which yield (see an earlier 
version of the present paper [1986b]) that rr(m I s') > Tr(m I s), for m = 0 and N. That 
is, the probability that all managers are good, or that all managers are bad, is higher 
in a more centralized economy. 
4. This approach was suggested by a referee. 
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II. MANAGERIAL OUTPUT 
The relationship between the quality of managers and the 
output or the performance of an organization is complicated. It 
depends not only on the distribution of ability and on the tasks that 
managers perform, but also on the positive and negative externali- 
ties that good and bad managers exert on one another. In this 
section we examine these aspects using the simple model, described 
in a part of the last section, in which there are only two managers 
in the decentralized as well as in the centralized economy. 
First, consider the case where the expected output of both 
economies is the same if they have the same number of good 
managers. Then, from the observation made earlier that the 
distribution of the number of good managers in the centralized 
economy is a mean-preserving spread of the corresponding distribu- 
tion in the decentralized economy, it follows that the output in the 
centralized economy is smaller than that in the decentralized 
economy if the output is concave in the number of good managers. 
The opposite is the case if the output is convex in the number of good 
managers. 
The relative performance of the centralized economy is further 
weakened if the comparison is based not on the expected output but 
on the expected utility of the output, and if the utility displays some 
risk aversion. In fact, even when output is convex in the number of 
good managers, if the utility is sufficiently concave in output, the 
expected utility will be higher in the decentralized economy. 
In the rest of this section we analyze a specific example with 
explicit managerial tasks. Managers select projects and future 
managers. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types 
of projects: good projects, yielding an (expected net) profit x; and 
bad projects, yielding a profit -x. Half the projects are good; half 
are bad. Bad managers are assumed not to have discriminating 
ability; they randomly accept a fraction p2 of the projects. Good 
managers are better at choosing future managers as well as 
projects; they accept a good project with probability p1 and a bad 
project with probability p', where p' > P2 > p'. The fraction of 
projects that a good manager accepts isp1 (p1 + p')/2. 
In economy s' a project is accepted only if both managers 
accept it. In contrast, in economy s a project is accepted if either of 
the two independent managers accept it. Thus, the "decentralized" 
economy is more decentralized in the selection of successors as well 
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as of projects.5 Let Y(m Is) denote the profit of economy s if there 
are m good managers. Then,6 
(13) Y(OIs) = 0, Y(ls) = 1 -P2, and Y(21s) = 2(1 -Pi). 
(14) Y(Ols') = 0, Y(ljs') =P2, and Y(2)s') = 2pl. 
The steady-state profit of economy s is Y(s) = EmTrr(m Is) Y(m Is). 
AY = Y(s) - Y(s') is the difference between the profits of the two 
economies. Then, (10), (11), (13), and (14) yield 
(15) AY= 
-2rr(21s)(1 - 2p) + rr(ljs)(l - 2p2) - 28(pl -p), 
where 8 = q2(1 - q1)Q2/(1 - Q)2 > 0. Now consider the case where 
both types of managers accept the same fraction of projects (that is, 
p1 = p2 = p). Then, the screening of projects by managers is "tight" 
or "slack" depending on whether p is smaller or larger than one 
half. It follows from (15) that the profit of the decentralized 
economy is larger than that of the centralized economy, if the 
screening of projects by managers is tight, while it is smaller, if the 
screening of projects by managers is slack. 
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